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NOTES
THE FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
A. Introduoton
The invention of the automobile and the inevitable accidents
which followed required the creation and adoption of new prin-
ciples of law. One of the initial propositions accepted by the
courts was that the mere existence of a family relationship be-
tween the owner of an automobile and the individual who was
negligently driving it when an accident occurred did not impose
liability upon the owner.1 Unless the parent was negligent in en-
trusting his automobile to his child who was known to be a reck-
less and careless driver,2 a parent could not be held liable for
the negligent operation of his automobile by his child unless at
the time of the accident the parent and child were engaged in a
joint adventure,3 or the child was operating the car as an agent
or servant of his parent.4 This required that the child be driving
in the furtherance of his parent's business5 or under his direction
and control.0 Many courts began to realize that this judicial rea-
soning allowed the owner of an automobile, which had been pur-
chased for use by his family, to escape liability when one of the
members of his family, who was driving the car for his own
business or pleasure, negligently injured the person or property
of a third party. A second important consideration which led the
courts to modify the above broad proposition was that in most
instances the negligent driver was financially irresponsible.
1. Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920); Smith v. Callahan,
34 Del. 129, 144 At. 46 (1928) ; Pratt v. Clothier, 119 Me. 203, 110 At. 353
(1920); Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935); Ritter v.
Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 135 S.E. 601 (1926); Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis.
400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924).
2. Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So. 621 (1917); Arkin v. Page,
287 Ill. 420, 123 N.E. 30 (1919); Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S.E.
632 (1917); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1150 (1925).
3. Lucey v. Hope & Sons Engraving & Mfg. Co., 45 R.I. 103, 120 Atl. 62
(1923); Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936).
4. Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949); Dement v.
Summer, 175 Miss. 290, 165 So. 791 (1936); Wirth v. Gabry, 120 N.J.L. 432,
200 Atl. 556 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 122 N.J.L. 95, 4 A.2d 281 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
5. Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935); Annot., 100
A.L.R. 1014 (1936).
6. "The presence of the owner in a motor vehicle driven by his daughter,
whose operation he recognizes and counsels, is evidence that the driver is the
owner's servant or agent, so as to render him liable for the driver's negligent
injury to another." Straffus v. Barclay, 147 Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 .(1949).
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B. Legal Principles Involved
Many courts began to stretch the principles of the law of
agency and of master and servant to include the so-called "family
purpose" doctrine under which the purchaser and title holder of
an automobile bought for the use and pleasure of his family
would be liable for negligent acts committed by members of his
family while using the vehicle for their own pleasure.7 This doc-
trine is an example of one of the many legal fictions created by
the judiciary in order to reach a desired result.,, Most of the
states which have adopted this doctrine recognize that it is an
instrument of policy intended to place the liability upon the
party most easily held responsible. This sentiment was aptly
expressed in Turner v. Hall's Adm'x. 9 "The Family Purpose
Doctrine is a humanitarian one designed for protection of the
public generally, and resulted from recognition of the fact that
in the vast majority of instances an infant has not sufficient
property in his own right to indemnify one who may suffer from
his negligent act."' 0 This doctrine, obviously an application of
the rule of respondeat superior," should not be inappropriately
applied in a situation in which a genuine agency relationship
exists, such as where a member of the family is driving the motor
vehicle for the transportation of the owner or in direct further-
ance of the owner's business. An attempt to apply the family pur-
pose doctrine should not be made unless the member of the own-
er's household was using the automobile for his own purposes.12
Because this doctrine changed the existing common law,13 very
little uniformity has been achieved in the application of the doc-
trine among the state courts. Approximately half of our states,
South Carolina included,14 have adopted it15 while many others
7. Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961); Davis v.
Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1913); Eagon v. Woolard, 122 W. Va.
565, 11 S.E.2d 257 (1940); PRossER, TORTs 496-99 (3d ed. 1964); See gen-
erally Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MIcH L. REy.
846 (1928).
8. Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966 (1917) ; King v. Smythe,
140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 396 (1918) ; 20 TENN. L. REv. 376 (1948).
9. 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952).
10. Id. at 32.
11. Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn. App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202 (1950) ; 24 VA.
L. REv. 931 (1938).
12. Rauckborst v. Krant, 216 Ky. 323, 287 S.W. 895 (1926); Hildock v.
Grosse, 339 Pa. 222, 5 A2d 565 (1939).
13. See cases cited supra note 1.
14. Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1913).
15. Bums v. Main, 87 F. Supp. 705 (D. Alaska 1950); Bolty v. Bonner, 95
Colo. 350, 35 P.2d 1015 (1934); Dibble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65 A.2d 479
(1949) ; Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E2d 398 (1953) ; Masser v. Reid,
186 Tenn. 94, 208 S.W.2d 528 (1948) ; COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed. 1932).
1966]
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have expressly rejected it.16 The remaining states which honor
the policy considerations of this doctrine have accomplished the
same results by enacting specific legislation which holds the
owner of a vehicle responsible for all injuries negligently in-
flicted while his motor vehicle is being used by another with the
owner's consent, express or implied,17 including members of his
family.
18
C. Requirements of the Doctrine
There are three basic requirements of the family purpose doc-
trine. First, at the time of the accident the automobile in ques-
tion must have been maintained by the owner for the pleasure
and use of his family.19 The intended use for which the automo-
bile was purchased is immaterial. The use actually made of the
car is the determining factor and one which is a question to be
decided by a jury.20 Where an automobile is maintained for busi-
ness purposes and not for the convenience and use of the family,
this doctrine will not apply.2 1 The second requirement is that at
the time of the accident the automobile in question must have
been used by a member of the owner's family.22 Generally, the
owner of the vehicle is not liable for the negligent acts of a rela-
tive who is not a member of the immediate family,23 however,
the relationship which exists between these two parties is a
question for the jury.24 Liability has been denied under this doc-
trine in cases in which the driver of the automobile was a brother-
16. Taylor v. Bennett, 323 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1963); Karrh v. Brown, 35
Ala. App. 308, 46 So. 2d 430 (1950) ; Richardson v. Donaldson, 220 Ark. 173,
246 S.W.2d 551 (1952) ; Haskey v. Williams, 360 Pa. 78, 60 A.2d 32 (1948);
Ener v. Gandy, 138 Tex. 295, 158 S.W.2d 989 (1942).
17. Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937); Johnson v. John-
son, 225 Iowa 7, 279 N.W. 139 (1938) ; Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86
N.W.2d 585 (1957); Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 152 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
18. McKnight v. Gilgean, 29 Cal. App. 2d 218, 84 P2d 213 (1938) ; Maine v.
Maine & Sons Inc., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Koski v. Muccilli,
201 Minn. 549, 277 N.W. 229 (1938).
19. Kentucky v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Rubenstein
v. Williams, 61 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Botty v. Bonner, 95 Colo. 350, 35
P.2d 1015 (1934) ; Haley v. Litzinger, 131 Pa. Super. 559, 200 At. 165 (1938);
Ritter v. Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 135 S.E. 601 (1926).
20. Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn. App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202 (1950).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 At. 498 (1930) ; Smith v. Bums,
71 Ore. 133, 142 Pac. 352 (1914) ; Compare, Levy v. Rubin, 181 Ga. 187, 182
S.E. 176 (1935).
24. Hewitt v. Fleming, 172 S.C. 266, 173 S.E. 808 (1934).
[Vol. 18
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in-law,2 5 stepdaughter,26 son-in-law,27 or nephew.28 In order to
be a "member" of the owner's family within the purview of the
doctrine, the owner must be under some legal or moral obligation
to support the driver.2 9 Third, the automobile must have been
used with the permission, either express or implied, of the own-
er.3 0 This requirement may also be fulfilled when a member of
the owner's family to whom the owner first gave permission
allows a third party to drive the automobile.3 1 The critical cri-
terion in the latter instance is that a member of the family must
have been present in the automobile at the time the accident
occurred.3 2
When these three requirements have been met, the doctrine can
be imposed. Liability is founded on the use of the vehicle for the
purpose for which it was provided 3 and not on the existence of
the family relationship34 or the fact that the vehicle was en-
trusted to a minor.3 5
D. Liability of the Owner
Normally, liability is imposed on the head of the family who
maintains the automobile for the convenience and use of the
members of his family.36 Where title to the automobile is in the
father's name, but the car was purchased for and is used almost
exclusively by his child, the doctrine will not apply37 unless the
father has possession or control of the vehicle.8 8 However, a
25. Jones v. Golick, 46 Nev. 10, 206 Pac. 679 (1922).
26. Wolfson v. Rainey, 51 Ga. App. 493, 180 S.E. 913 (1935).
27. Bryant v. Keen, 43 Ga. App. 251, 158 S.E. 445 (1931) ; Robinson v. Luns-
ford, 330 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1959).
28. Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337, 180 S.E. 389 (1933).
29. Robinson v. Lunsford, 330 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1959).
30. Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn. App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202 (1950).
31. Turner v. Hall's Admix., 252 S.W2d 30 (Ky. 1952); Ulman v. Linde-
man, 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919); Eagon v. Woolard, 122 W. Va. 565,
11 S.E.2d 257 (1940).
A good example of this situation is presented in Driver v. Smith, in which
the owner's daughter allowed her boyfriend to drive her father's car. 47 Tenn.
App. 505, 339 S.W.2d 135 (1959).
32. Griffith v. Fannin, 306 Ky. 279, 206 S.W2d 965 (1947).
33. Grier v. Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931).
34. Messer v. Reid, 186 Tenn. 94, 208 S.W.2d 592 (1948); 20 TENN. L. Rxv.
376 (1948).
35. Scates v. Sanderfer, 163 Tenn. 558, 44 S.W.2d 310 (1931).
36. Kentucky v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1940); Mitchell
v. Muller, 45 Ga. App. 285, 164 S.E. 278 (1932); Hope, The Doctrine of the
Family Automobile, 8 A.B.A.J. 359 (1922).
37. Smith v. Doyle, 98 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
38. Euster v. Vogel, 227 Ky. 735, 13 S.W2d 1028 (1929).
19661
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father cannot transfer liability by putting title to an automobile,
which he purchased for the use and convenience of his family,
in the name of one of the other members of the family.39
In situations in which someone other than the head of the
family is the owner of the vehicle,40 the family purpose doctrine
has also been applied. For example, Ficdem 'v. Heichelheim4'
held that a married woman who permitted her family to drive
a car which was her separate property was liable for the negli-
gent driving of her minor son even though she was not the head
of the family. However, in situations where a child, rather than
a parent, is the owner of the vehicle, the courts generally have
denied application of the doctrine. Exemplary of this holding
are Posey v. Ifrogh,42 which involved a self-supporting child who
was not the head of his family but who owned and maintained a
car for the use of his family, and White v. McCade,43 which con-
cerned a daughter who owned and maintained her own car but
who allowed her father to drive it at various times. In both these
situations, the courts held that the family purpose doctrine was
not available to impose liability on the owner of the car.
Under most circumstances the family purpose doctrine will not
apply to a corporation with respect to vehicles owned by it,4 4
but a family corporation may be held liable under this doctrine
if it maintains an automobile for the general use of the family.45
Ef. S'tatutor-y Liabglity
There are two types of statutes holding the owner liable for
damages and injuries caused by his automobile. The first and
most efficient type codified the principles of the family purpose
doctrine40 and in most instances rendered the owner of a motor
vehicle liable for the negligence of anyone operating his vehicle
with his permission, express or implied, whether acting for the
39. Emanuelson v. Johnson, 148 Minn. 417, 182 N.W. 521 (1931).
40. Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777, 176 S.E. 540 (1934); McNa-
mara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754, 127 S.W.2d 160 (1939); Hill v. Smith, 32 Tenn.
App. 172, 222 S.W.2d 207 (1949).
41. 49 Ga. App. 777, 176 S.E. 540 (1934).
42. 65 N.D. 490, 259 N.W. 757 (1935).
43. 208 N.C. 301, 180 S.E. 704 (1935).
44. Whiteman v. Al's Tire & Sert. Garage, Inc., 115 Conn. 379, 161 At. 519
(1932).
45. Durso v. A. D. Coggolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941).
46. Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937) ; Moore v. Palmer,
350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W.2d 585 (1957); Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., 201
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owner or otherwise. 47 Such statutes impose liability upon an own-
er for injuries resulting from "negligence in operation" of the
vehicle with negligence being defined by the laws of the various
states. These definitions include ordinary and gross negligence48
but usually do not cover wilful misconduct or intoxication of
the driver.49 These statutes have superseded the common law
for they make the individual who drives the vehicle with the
owner's consent, either express or implied, the agent of the owner,
thereby dispensing with the common law requirement of actual
agency as a condition of the owner's liability.5 0
The constitutional validity of these statutes has been attacked
on the grounds of deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law,5 1 lack of equal protection of the law,5 2 and upon
the grounds that they are arbitrary or oppressive.5 3 However,
the Supreme Court of the United States has sustained these
statutes as a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
54
These statutes do not create an independent liability on the
part of the owner 55 but only hold him liable when liability at-
taches to the operator of the vehicle. The imposition by statute
of liability on the owner of a motor vehicle has no effect upon
the liability of the operator, for the injured party may sue either
the operator or owner alone, or both jointly.56 When the action
is brought against the owner alone, he may, if free from fault
himself, secure indemnity from the operator.57 However, in the
absence of a prior agreement, the operator may not secure in-
demnity from the owner. 58 A judgment rendered against the
47. Ibid.
48. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 5 Cal. App. 644, 43 P.2d 332 (1935); Compare,
Peyton v. Delnay, 348 Mich. 238, 83 N.W.2d 204 (1957).
49. Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937).
50. Forrester v. Jerman, 90 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
51. Selaine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389, 206 N.W. 130 (1925); Bowerman v.
Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95, 219 N.W. 69 (1928).
52. Young v. Masie, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
53. Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95, 219 N.W. 69 (1928).
54. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
55. Arnett v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 188 Iowa 540, 176 N.W. 322 (1920) ; Com-
pare, Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
.56. Milburn v. Foster, 8 Cal. App. 2d 478, 480, 47 P.2d 1106, 1107 (1938);
Hutch v. Lovejoy, 142 Misc. 137, 254 N.Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
57. Kramer v. Morgan, 85 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1936); Lunderberg v. Bierman,
241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); Trauk v. Dinyler, 309 N.Y. 395, 131
N.E.2d 564 (1955).
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operator alone is not res judicata and does not establish any lia-
bility of the owner as a matter of law where the owner was not
a party to the action."0
The second type of statute places a lien on the automobile
causing the injury where the vehicle was operated in violation of
the provisions of the law or in a negligent or careless manner,
except where it has been stolen and the thief caused the injury.0°
The South Carolina statute is illustrative of this type and
provides:
When a motor vehicle is operated in violation of the pro-
visions of law or negligently, carelessly, recklessly, wilfully
or wantonly and any person receives personal injury or
property is damaged thereby or a cause of action for wrong-
ful death arises therefrom, damages recoverable therefor
shall be and constitute a lien next in priority to the lien for
State and county taxes upon such motor vehicle, recoverable
in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the person sus-
taining such damages or personal representatives of the
deceased or any one or more of the beneficiaries for whom
such cause of action shall be brought under §§ 10-1951 and
10-1952 for the benefit of all such beneficiaries may attach
such motor vehicle in the manner provided by law for attach-
ments in this State. But this lien shall not exist if the motor
vehicle was stolen by the breaking of a building under a
secure lock or when the vehicle is securely locked. 1
This statute would hold the owner liable to the extent of the
value of the car and yet establish no personal liability unless
there was a master-servant relationship between him and the
driver or unless he was negligent in entrusting his automobile
to an incompetent driver. Actually, no further statutory language
is needed in South Carolina because this state recognizes the
"family purpose doctrine" which does impose personal liability.
62
It should be noted further in connection with this lien that
any judgment obtained may be enforced against the car in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.63 The Uniform Com-
59. De Laurentis v. Firemans Fund Indem. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 706, 165 N.Y.S2d
942 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
60. S. C. CoDE ANx. § 45-551 (1962).
61. Ibid.
62. Hewitt v. Fleming, 172 S.C. 226, 173 S.E. 808 (1934).
63. Stewart v. Martin, 232 S.C. 483, 102 S.E.2d 886 (1958)
[Vol. 18
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mercial Code, which will become effective in this state on Jan-
uary 1, 1968, will not change the law in regard to this priority.64
F. The Law in South Carolina
"The family purpose doctrine is applied in this state. .... ,,65
The decision which determined the course for South Carolina
in this area and one which presents a clear illustration of the
family purpose doctrine is Davis v. Litttefiel. 6 6 In this case the
defendant's son negligently injured the plaintiff while driving
the family car in pursuit of his own pleasure. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court relied upon the principles of a master-serv-
ant relationship in holding the defendant liable for the negligent
acts of his son. The court reasoned that since the defendant-
father would have been liable if his son had been driving his
mother on an errand when the accident occurred, or if the de-
fendant-father had hired a chauffeur to drive his son on pleasure
trips, he should also be held liable in this case. The fact that the
son drove himself did not in any way change the business for
which the machine was used for, in any event, the automobile
was used for the pleasure of the defendant's family.
Mooney v. Gilreath67 widened the scope of the doctrine and
established the fact that the genesis of the family purpose doc-
trine in South Carolina is agency. In this case the driver of the
car at the time of the accident was the eighteen-year-old son of
the defendant. The automobile, of which the defendant's son
owned a one-half interest, was purchased at the request of the
son who had subsequently spent approximately one hundred fifty
dollars "fixing it up." On the night of the accident the defend-
ant's son was sent on an errand for his father. Unable to carry
out this errand, the son proceeded to drive about town entirely
for his own pleasure. The South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed the circuit court which had held the defendant liable for
the negligent acts of his son committed during the time the son
was driving the car about town. The court stated that since the
car was jointly owned by the defendant and his son and since
use of the car for the son's convenience and pleasure was part of
the common purpose and joint business for which the car had
been purchased, liability could be found, although it was not
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112.
65. Hewitt v. Fleming, 172 S.C. 226, 173 S.E. 808 (1934).
66. 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1913).
67 124 S.C. 1, 117 S.E. 186 (1922); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 226 (1920).
NoTs1966]
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necessary to do so, under the principles of partnership agency
or under the law of master and servant.
It should be emphasized that simply because title to the auto-
mobile is in the defendant-father's name, liability does not neces-
sarily attach under this doctrine. In Porter v. Hardee8 the fam-
ily purpose doctrine was held not to apply even though title to
the automobile, negligently driven by the defendant's son, was
in the defendant-father's name. This case is distinguishable from
others because the son had purchased the car with his own money
and operated it almost exclusively as his own. In order for the
doctrine to apply under these circumstances, the automobile in
question must have been kept for the general use and convenience
of the family and at the time of the accident there must have
existed the relationship of principal and agent which would have
rendered the father liable for the acts of his son.69
Two factors related to this problem should be noted. The doc-
trine would still apply even though the automobile was operated
by a companion of the child for whom the car was maintained
and to whom it was furnished by the defendant.70 It would be
illogical to hold otherwise for if liability were not imposed in
this situation the family purpose doctrine could easily be
circumvented by merely allowing a friend or companion of the
driver to operate the vehicle. Under these circumstances there is
an implied agency that places liability on the owner. Also, in
situations in which the doctrine would apply, constructive service
on the nonresident owner may be had by service of .process on
the Chief Highway Commissioner.71-
G. Concwion
Our courts and legislatures have come to realize that the social
needs of the populace greatly outweigh the advantage of having
the law kept within the bounds established at a time before the
automobile was invented. Undoubtedly, this is a desirable realiza-
tion for nothing breeds injustice to a. greater degree than does an
unchanging and unyielding concept of law. As a matter of policy
the family purpose doctrine is superior to the more logical strict
68. 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963).
69 Norwood v. Coley, 235 S.C. 314, 111 S.E.2d 550 (1959).
70. Golden v. Medford, 62 Ga. App. 229, 8 S.E.2d 531 (1940); Gross v. Wil-
liams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169 (1928); Burbage v. Curry, 127 S.C. 349,
121 S.E. 267 (1924).
71. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-104 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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agency concept. The average child or wife who drives the family
car is usually financially unable to pay any judgment that might
be obtained against him. On the other hand, the owner of the
automobile is more normally in a position to meet financial obli-
gations that might arise as the result of an accident. Justice
Cardozo said: "Finally, when the social needs demand one settle-
ment rather than another, there are times when we must bend
symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of
other and larger ends."
WnaaAx W. Wnanxs, JR.
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